The Impact of War on the Quality of Local Governance*

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Abstract

We investigate the legacy of civil war violence on the quality of local representation in Colombia. In particular, we investigate how high levels of violence against local authorities and political leaders during the late 1980s and mid 1990s shaped the quality of candidates and local authorities in recent years. For this purpose, we exploit an unprecedented political reform during the 2011 local elections which allowed different national control agencies to share information and identify candidates who were ineligible to run due to their judicial and administrative records. We find that the historical rate of political homicides is associated with more "criminal" candidates in 2011. To address the potential endogenity between corruption, criminality and past violence, we exploit differences in the support for third-parties in 1988 as an instrument for initial levels of political violence. Our instrumental variables estimates confirm a large, positive and significant effect of past civil war violence on the current levels of administrative and political corruption in the country.

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1 Introduction

In the 45 days prior to Election Day on January 30, 2005 in Iraq, about 150 election-related violent events were documented. These ranged from vandalism of campaign material to death threats, kidnapping, assassination, and suicide bombings (IFES 2005). Between 2003 and 2005, different insurgent groups had killed "dozens, if not hundreds, of local and national government officials and political party officials, as well as judges, by means of assassination squads, roadside bombs and suicide attacks" (HRW 2005:62).

This situation of political violence is not unique to Iraq. Violence against politicians and political candidates is quite common in conflict prone countries holding regular elections. In Afghanistan for instance, candidates faced "assassinations, kidnappings, and intimidation by insurgents as well as by rival candidates" in 2010 (HRW 2010). Similarly, Peru's resurgent guerrilla group "Shining Path" (Sendero Luminoso) has reportedly threatened mayors and other local authorities, and boycotted elections in recent years.[1] In Sri Lanka during the recent civil war, both the Tamils and the People's Liberation Front were reportedly engaged in violence against political candidates and their supporters.[2] Even small insurgent groups, like the DLDF militia in Mt. Elgon, Kenya, "waged a campaign of terror in favor of opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidates for local council and parliament" (HRW 2011).

How does political violence during war shape the quality of elections? Despite the breath of scholarly work on the causes and consequences of both democracy and civil war, we know less about how these states interact-except in studies investigating the isolated effect of democracy on the likelihood of civil war onset, or similarly, the odds of democratization after a civil war has ended. [3] Little is known about the conditions in which war and democracy can coexist or about the mechanisms explaining the persistence of armed conflict under democracy. The underlying assumption seems to that they do not happen at the same time.

[1] See for example: "Sendero Luminoso" intenta sabotear elecciones en Perú" at http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2005/12/26/205942/sendero-luminoso-intenta-sabotear-elecciones-en-peru.html "Perú pide ayuda a EE UU ante el rebrote de Sendero Luminoso" El Pais, October 12, 2012.

[2] See example "Election Campaign in Sri Lanka Closes With a Flurry of Violence". Los Angeles Times February 13, 1989.

[3] There is, as well, a prolific literature on a theorized positive effect of democracy on the onset of international war—the so-called "democratic peace" theory (see e.g., Russett 1993).

But they do. Far from being mutually exclusive, democracy and civil war can coexist for years and even decades. Between 1945 and 2006 approximately 10% of all country-years that had a democracy were enduring some type of civil war; furthermore, between 30% and 50% of all country-years in civil war in that period occurred in regimes classified as democracies, depending on the source.[4] These cases include highly violent armed conflicts like the one in Sri Lanka, and low intensity wars such as those in Colombia, The Philippines, India, and Indonesia.

Theoretically, the coexistence of war and democracy might seem puzzling since they are often approached as two distinct political equilibria. Democracy is, after all, characterized as a regime where power is contested with ballots, not bullets. In addition, in some cases of regular civil war it would be impossible to hold elections-think, for example, of the current situation in Syria. Yet, in developing democracies a "mixed equilibrium" is common: in some areas of a country democratic institutions work more or less well to aggregate preferences peacefully, while in many others democracy is nominal at best, the state is weak, and non-state armed actors have the capacity to operate as a de facto ruler at the local level; in other areas, the state might have sufficient control to organize elections, but insurgents also have the capacity to boycott them. In short, democracy and civil war can coexist within the same country and even within a given subnational unit.[5]

So how does civil war shape democracy? If this political system is supposed to offer the necessary mechanisms to aggregate social preferences in order to avoid, among other things, the use of political violence, how does it perform in a context where some political groups wage war against each other? If free and open participation is essential to democracy, how does the use of violence by organized groups affect democratic processes and their outcomes? Furthermore, the international push for democracy in civil war contexts has been strong in cases like Iraq and Afghanistan based on the assumption that democracy should help achieve key goals like stability and representation-but does it?

Scholars tend to assume that war "erodes institutions and organizations, [and] affects social capital" (Collier 1999:169) so it is natural to presume a detrimental impact of war on

[4] These figures are calculated with the Polity 2 data, where a democracy has a score of 6 or more in the polity2 score. Armed conflicts are taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, where minor conflicts are coded using a 25 deaths threshold and wars with a 1,000 deaths threshold.

[5] As the emerging literature on rebel governance shows, the existence of large areas or pockets of insurgent or militia rule are quite common even in countries with middle state capacity like India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Colombia (Arjona et. al 2012).

the quality of democratic processes. Yet how this happens and why it happens has not been theorized or explored empirically. As Blattman and Miguel (2010:42) put it, "the social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts." What is more, recent findings suggest that violence might actually increase collective action, political participation and trust (e.g. Bateson 2012; Bellows and Miguel 2009, Gilligan et al. 2010; Blattman and Annan 2009), impacts which may be even *beneficial* in a democratic system. In order to advance the debate, we need to explore how specific war dynamics can shape different democratic outcomes, identify the mechanisms, derive testable implications, and use research designs that allow us to overcome endogeneity issues due to reversed causality or omitted variables.

In this paper we aim to move in this direction by investigating the legacies of violence against local politicians and leaders on the quality of candidates. A growing literature stresses the importance of good politicians—competent and honest individuals—in bringing about good governance and desirable economic and political outcomes (e.g. Alesina 1988; Besley 2006). If the quality of political candidates matters, what are the enduring effects of violence against the political class within a context of civil war?

We approach armed groups as organizations that not only seek to control over specific territories (e.g. McColl 1969; Guevara 1997; Galula 1964; Kalyvas 2006) but also to maximize the by-products of that control, which include material resources, access to political networks, social influence and recruits (Arjona 2010). Politicians may facilitate or hinder this process: as allies, they can aid armed groups to establish control, capture the local government, and become a de facto ruler, seizing all sorts of valued resources. But as opponents, politicians may interfere with the group's plans of taking over local governance by not cooperating with specific demands, or even by organizing collective resistance against a rebel movement.

In an attempt to avoid this kind of opposition from politicians, an armed group that aspires to rule a given locality can rely on several strategies: (i) use violence against authorities or candidates who are either allied with other armed actors or simply opposed to the group ruling the locality; (ii) mobilize and coerce voters in favor of the group's preferred candidates; and (iii) engage in fraud to secure a favorable outcome during elections. Under these circumstances, political violence raises the stakes of the electoral game making politics a dangerous profession. Over time, this can have a long lasting impact on

the quality of representation since good politicians in contested areas are killed, displaced or expelled from the political system. Hence, civil war violence can have an immediate impact on the quality of democratic elections but also a long-lasting effect on the quality of representation.

We explore empirically these ideas using sub-national data from Colombia, where a low intensity conflict and democratic elections have co-existed for decades. In particular, we exploit a recent political reform that expanded the criteria by which candidates could be banned from running for office, and mandated the National Electoral Council (NEC), the main electoral authority of the country, to identify and announce endorsed candidates who were ineligible to run for public office due to their judicial and administrative records. In the local elections of 2011, the NEC identified 821 candidates that had to be excluded from the ballot, including candidates for governors, mayors, and local councils due to criminal records or fiscal or disciplinary sanctions. This information allows us to measure the number of "bad candidates" backed officially by a political party who were intending to run for office in the approximately 1100 municipalities of the country.

We test our hypotheses by focusing on a very specific form of violence perpetrated during the 1990s by both paramilitary and guerrilla groups fighting in the ongoing Colombian conflict. After 1988, when mayoral elections were introduced for the first time in the country, a wave of violence led to the assassination of thousands of left-wing politicians and community leaders by right-wing paramilitary groups. The guerrillas responded to this initial wave of violence by killing many members and leaders of the traditional parties, especially of the Liberal Party. Overall, at least 2,400 politicians and local activists were killed between 1988 and 2001.[6] So we explore the effect of this violence on the quality of candidates running for office in the regional elections of 2011.

Our findings show that higher rates of political assassinations during the late 1980s and 1990s are associated with a higher number of "criminal" candidates in 2011. This result is substantial, significant, and robust to the inclusion of a wide set of controls and specifications. Since high levels of previous violence are potentially correlated with the same factors associated with corruption (e.g. poverty and natural resource rents), this effect may

[6] According to available data at the local level, there were at least 1,775 mayors and council members killed, and a total of 2,436 politicians and activists. However, other sources estimate a total of 3,000 assassinations of members of a single left-wing party, the Union Patriotica (UP).

not correspond to the long-term causal effect of violence on the quality of candidates. To address this issue we first use the support for third-parties in 1988 as an instrument for the initial levels of political violence. This instrumental variable model not only confirms our findings but suggests that omitted variables produce a bias downwards in our OLS specification. Second, we perform a "placebo" test in which we use different forms of violence presumably unrelated to selective political assassinations (e.g., terrorists attacks and massacres of civilians). This exercise confirms our hypothesis about the specific effect of political murder on the quality of candidates.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the relevant literature. The second section presents the theory. We identify the mechanisms by which violence against politicians can shape the supply and demand of candidates based on the analysis of the behavior of armed groups, potential candidates, parties, and voters. The third section introduces the Colombian case. The fourth section presents the research design. We conclude with a discussion of the results.

2 The Literature

Having good politicians in office requires three conditions: a pool of good politicians; a party willing to endorse them to run for office; and voters willing to elect them. What do we know about how war affects each of these conditions?

There are some insights in the literature about how war might shape the behavior of voters. Recent work has found that wartime violence increases political participation in general and turnout in particular in some post-war democracies (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman and Annan 2009; Shewfelt 2009; Balcells 2009). Yet, since these studies focus on the post-war period, they do not take into account how war conditions affect civilian choices and behaviors. In addition, the mechanisms linking wartime violence and post-war participation remain obscure.

A few authors have studied voting behavior in wartime Colombia and concluded that guerrilla attacks seem to reduce turnout (Gallego 2011; García and Hoskins 2003), and paramilitary violence decreases both political competition (Gallego 2011) and influences how people vote (Acemoglu et. al 2009). Yet, all these authors focus on presidential or congressional elections, overlooking how conflict might shape local elections and, conse-

quentially, the quality of local governments. Although the national government can also be affected by war, the context in which politicians and armed groups behave on the national stage varies greatly from that of the localities—which are usually peripheral areas where state institutions are weak and the state does not have the monopoly of the use of violence. In order to understand how democracy works in contexts of armed conflict, we need to inquire about local governments in areas where conflict is actually present.

Turning to political selection, how does civil war affect political parties' decisions regarding who to endorse in a particular election? To our knowledge, there are no studies on this issue.[7] There is a vast literature on political selection by parties, but it gives no clues about how war might change democratic processes and outcomes. Recent work on selection of criminal candidates in India focuses on what a criminal candidate can bring to political parties under different scenarios, but it fails to theorize about the ways in which the presence of criminal organizations affects parties' choices.[8] Rather, they tend to assume that criminals are randomly distributed across India and parties always have the opportunity to endorse them. Their choice is explained by local-level factors such as political competition (Aidt et. al 2011; Galasso and Nannicini 2011), literacy (Aidt et. al 2011), and ethnic divisions (Vaishnav 2011). These studies have highlighted the role that criminals' capacity to use coercion—an attribute that bad candidates may have in conflict areas—can play in shaping political selection; however, they fail to theorize about how the presence of criminal organizations transform local conditions in ways that favor or hamper the selection of criminal candidates. In addition, all these papers rely on candidates' self-reported previous offenses, making biased measurement error potentially pervasive.

Finally, how does civil war affect the decision of potential candidates—both good and bad—to run for office? A growing literature on the quality of politicians has identified several determinants of the supply of bad politicians in peacetime, including formal insti-

[7]In a theoretical paper, Chaves and Robinson (2010) study the formation of new political alliances within civil war with an aplication to Colombia and Sierra Leone. However, they focus on national, not subnational-level politics.

[8]These paper study how criminal politicians can provide money (Vaishnav 2011; Dutta and Gutpa 2012); coercion to make credible promises to protect co-ethnics (Vaishnav 2011) or repress turnout among supporters of other parties (Aidt et. al 2011); and a higher capacity to contest elections if they lose (Dutta and Gupta 2012). In addition, one study argues that these benefits are especially handy in districts where competition is greater and literacy is low (Aidt et. al 2011), while another claims that parties endorse criminals when facing low competition because they can bring resources to the table without jeopardizing swing voters who are more sensitive to candidates' quality (Dutta and Gupta 2012).

tutions, rents, and imperfect information.[9] The role of violence, however, has been largely overlooked, except in Dal Bo et. al (2006). These authors propose a model where punishment by pressure groups—which can include violence—decreases the quality of those who are wiling to run for office. More specifically, the model predicts that when interest groups use violence to threaten public officials, the overall quality of government representatives decreases. Furthermore, violence also increases the scope of influence of these groups through bribes, thus further affecting the quality of government. This result is insightful to the study of democracy in a context of armed conflict because, as we will argue, armed groups often behave like interest groups, seeking to influence policy via both legal and illegal means.

3 Theory

Good politicians-honest, competent individuals-can only get elected if they run for office and if a political party decides to endorse them. Civil war violence against politicians can shape both the supply and demand of good candidates via different mechanisms. In order to identify those mechanisms, we discuss armed groups' strategies and their effects on the behavior of potential candidates, political parties, and voters.

We start by recognizing that civil war fragments space: warring sides fight for control over local territories, subjecting local populations to either fighting or domination by the warring sides (Kalyvas 2006). In these areas, armed groups have incentives to maximize their intervention in local affairs as a means to seize resources and support, and increase their control over the population and territory (Arjona 2010). Influencing the local government is a key way to achieve these ends: it can provide access to networks and intelligence, political visibility, new recruits, and the capacity to influence policy and the allocation of resources in favorable ways. Armed groups may even appropriate public funds directly.[10] Guevara (1997:108) stressed the importance of creating a civil organization in controlled areas precisely in order to both strengthen control, and increase the prospects of a future enlargement of the guerrilla front.

[9] This is a very prolific literature. For useful reviews see Besley (2006) and Besley et. al (2005).

[10] The specific form in which an armed group may approach local authorities vary greatly, including elimination, oppression, cooptation, and collusion (see Arjona 2009:211; Staniland 2011). For the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to assume that armed groups have incentives to influence elections in order to ensure that whoever is elected can serve their interests.

Within a context of democracy, armed groups have incentives to interfere in local elections in order to ensure that whoever rules is amenable to their interests.[11] Those willing to rule in ways that favor armed actors are by definition bad candidates—they engage in illegal activities that favor violent groups. These are the ones armed groups bet for; in order to do so, they have three strategies at their disposal: (i) using violence against hard-to-control candidates, that is, stubborn political opponents, or good candidates—those who will not behave illegally; (ii) relying on coercion and mobilization to shape voters' choices; and (iii) engaging in fraud to alter the results of the elections by altering voter registration or vote counting.

We argue that these three strategies trigger different mechanisms that negatively affect both the supply and demand of good candidates, leading to candidates of worse quality in the locality. Furthermore, we contend that this effect is long lasting, as good candidates have incentives to leave the area or abandon their political careers. In what follows we discuss each of these mechanisms.

3.1 The supply of good candidates

Using violence against politicians is an effective way to eliminate undesirable competitors while increasing the expected costs for candidates that are not likely to give in or, worse, can help the enemy. Like most people, potential candidates are averse to risk of physical harm. If they perceive that participating in politics is dangerous, they are likely to desist of their political aspirations or move to a different place.[12] This is particularly the case of skilled candidates, who are more likely to have alternative options elsewhere or even within the municipality. Put differently, those with higher opportunity costs are less likely to opt for politics when the latter becomes a life-threatening career. To be sure, some highly motivated individuals will persist despite the threat; however, in most cases even truly committed politicians who have an exit option are likely to desist when their lives are

[11] Armed groups also have incentives to interfere in national elections either to boycott them them or to impelement favorable policy. We do not discuss this kind of intervention in this paper as we are mostly concerned with the effects on local governments. For a discussion of paramilitaries' legislative influence in Colombia see Acemoglu et. al (2009) and López (2011). For interference in national elections see Gallego (2011) and Garcia and Hoskins (2003).

[12] In fact, Steele (2010) argues that armed groups use violence strategically against loyal supporters of their enemies in order to displace them. Similarly, armed groups are likely to target politicians to create incentives for similar politicians to leave.

threatened.

It follows that in a locality where politicians are targeted, two types will remain in politics: those facing a low probability of being harmed because they are either allied with one group or likely to give in; and those with few alternatives. Skilled politicians who are not willing to negotiate with the armed group, on the other hand, are likely to move or leave their aspirations for public office. This mechanism is consistent with the argument made by other researchers that violence decreases political competition (Gallego 2011, Acemoglu et. al 2012).

In addition to shaping the pool of candidates, violent groups can also influence voting behavior. With their coercive power, they can suppress turnout or increase the number of votes for a particular candidate (e.g. Wilkinson 2003, Aid et. al 2011, Gallego 2011, Acemoglu et. al 2009). At the same time, armed groups often garner popular support. They have a broad portfolio of strategies to conquer, control, and rule populations such as providing public goods, intervening in favor of certain sectors of the population, and bringing about public order–all of which often leads locals to collaborate with the group in many forms (Arjona 2010). When election time comes, combatants can make use not only of coercion but also of their capacity to mobilize locals. In this way, voters may follow the guidelines of paramilitaries or guerrillas not just because they fear them, but also because they support them or expect benefits from the status quo.

Because state capacity is rarely strong in areas where armed groups operate, the latter can also coerce registrars and juries to get the electoral outcome they want. In some cases, armed groups may have permeated electoral authorities in ways that make fraud easy to implement. In other cases, coercion is needed. To be sure, this strategy requires the capacity to actually enforce orders given to electoral authorities or jurors at the polling stations. In this context, candidates who are not allied with the armed group know they are less likely to win: voters are less likely to support them, and even if they do, fraud is to be expected. As an Afghan political analyst put it, "There are some candidates that have ties to militias or warlords, who use guns to try to influence the elections. . . . If you don't have guns or money, it is hard to compete" (NYT 2010).

3.2 The demand of good candidates

Turning to the demand for candidates, armed groups' strategies also have a negative effect. Political parties aim to win the elections in as many places as possible. Endorsing bad candidates in areas where armed groups are present can bring several advantages. As mentioned before, armed groups can help the party to win by coercing or mobilizing voters, restricting competition, or interfering with voters' registration or vote counting. Parties have therefore incentives to endorse candidates supported by armed organizations capable of engaging in all these strategies. As incentives for parties to endorse this kind of candidates grow, the likelihood of finding good candidates on the ballot drops.

But endorsing candidates that have ties with illegal groups can be costly as well. The electorate in places where armed groups cannot control elections might be sensitive to parties' involvement with armed organizations. We can expect armed groups to rely on this strategy mostly when it can really make the difference between loosing and winning-that is, where competition is higher (Aidt et. al 2011). Competition may also increase demand for low-skilled candidates or those allied with an armed actor because the higher the number of parties running for office in a particular district, the more likely it is that when a party denies its endorsement to a bad candidate with prospects for winning another party offers support-and wins.

3.3 Overall effects on the quality of candidates

By using violence against candidates, coercing or mobilizing voters, and orchestrating fraud, armed groups increase the costs associated with participating in politics for those who are not allied with it, or are unwilling to bend to their demands. Armed groups also make these candidates less likely to be selected by political parties and less likely to win if they end up running. The immediate effect is a drop in the number of highly skilled candidates who are not associated with an armed organization on the ballot.

Over time, the quality of candidates will still be affected for at least two reasons. First, skillful politicians are scarce because many either fled looking for safety or abandoned their political aspirations. It takes time for a new generation of good politicians to be formed. And second, what being a politician means in the locality has changed: once the community becomes used to having either coopted politicians or armed groups' allies in power, it views

politics—and politicians—in a particular way. Once being a politician is associated with a lower status, corruption, and allies of armed organizations, the most skillful and honest persons in the locality are less likely to decide to run for office.

4 The Colombian Context

4.1 Background

The ongoing Colombian conflict started in the 1960s, right after a previous bloody war had ended. Several leftist guerrilla groups were formed, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Both groups described themselves as popular liberation movements seeking to bring about social justice and communism.

This was a low intensity conflict for several years; in the 1970s, however, the guerrillas began to expand into new areas of the country. They moved from poor and isolated places to areas that were closer to the center and had higher incomes and resources (Vélez 1999; Echandía 1999). They engaged in extortion, kidnapping, taxation, and drug cultivation and trafficking, which provided abundant resources. This growth, both in terms of geographical expansion and scope of activities, affected the interests of local elites in several regions of the country, particularly in the north. During this decade the FARC became the largest and most powerful of the guerrilla groups, followed by the ELN. Both groups were (and still are) highly disciplined. According to available estimates, by the late 1990s about three fourths of all Colombian municipalities had some form of presence of either of these organizations (Echandía 1999).

In part reacting to the threats that the guerillas posed to them, and in part responding to national-level changes, local elites began to form paramilitary forces. Although a few were self-defense groups organized by peasants, most were set up by landowners, cattle-raisers, emerald-traders, and drug traffickers (Romero 2003). At first, these paramilitary groups operated separately in different areas of the country. They financed their operations with a combination of taxes on economic activities in areas under their control, voluntary and forced regular payments by locals, and drug trafficking. Even though the state did not create these groups directly, there is substantial evidence of collusion as well as of silent toleration, including negligence in stopping instances of massive victimization of

civilians.[13] In addition, these groups managed to create very strong ties with local and regional political figures, which are now well documented by journalists and academics. In 1997 most paramilitary groups united under an umbrella organization called the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Although some of the operations of the blocs were planned at the level of the AUC, each bloc preserved a high degree of independence. Overall, paramilitary groups were less disciplined than their guerrilla counterparts.

Due to the growth of the guerrillas and the emergence and expansion of the paramilitaries, the armed conflict escalated throughout the 1980s, and reached a peak in the late 1990s. However, according to most sources, the amount of violence decreased in the mid-2000s (Security and Democracy Foundation 2006).

Different peace negotiations and demobilization processes have taken place during the last two decades. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several leftist guerrilla groups demobilized collectively and were given amnesty (like the M-19 and the Quintin Lame). Under the Uribe government (2002-2010), thousands of individual members of the FARC and the ELN deserted, but both groups are still active. Most paramilitary groups negotiated with the government and demobilized their members, although new groups quickly emerged and are now active in many regions of the country, mostly dedicated to drug trafficking and illegal mining. Although guerrilla groups are weakened, they are still active and have intensified their hit and run operations as a new peace process with the government is currently underway.

The Colombian conflict differs from many others in its duration: it is one of the longest internal armed conflicts that are still ongoing. This could raise doubts about the generalizability of the dynamics that we can find in this case. However, the country exhibits internal variation in almost every dimension that one might expect to matter in an investigation of wartime democracy: some armed groups have been operating for decades, but others were formed in recent years; armed groups have been present in some areas for thirty or forty years, but others were targeted only a few years ago; some areas have valuable legal natural resources like gold, others have coca leaves, and others lack any of such goods; ethnicity varies across and within regions, and within it traditional forms of social organization; both left-wing and right-wing groups operate; and even state capacity varies greatly over

[13]Several military commanders of the National Army have been found guilty due to either negligence or active participation in cases of massacres of civilians in several regions of the country.

time and space. Hence, despite its uniqueness as a long conflict, the Colombian case is well-suited for investigating many aspects of the conduct of war.

4.2 Elections in Colombia

Colombia is a republic with a bicameral Congress consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, both elected by popular vote. The country is divided into 32 departments and around 1100 municipalities. Since the mid-1980s the country has moved towards a decentralized system, in an effort to deepen democracy, increase political participation, and make public expenditure more efficient. In 1988 Colombians elected for the first time their mayors and departmental governors, who had until then been appointed. In the 1990s, a new constitution ended over a century of bipartisanship by facilitating the entry of new parties. Since then, the vote share of the traditional parties—the Liberal and Conservative—has substantially shrunk.

The armed conflict has long affected elections directly. Armed actors threaten and kill candidates, threaten voters, sabotage electoral days by making it impossible for inhabitants of certain localities to reach the polls, and even publicly support candidates and mobilize (occasionally by violent means) people to vote for them. A study reports 133 homicides and 434 kidnappings linked to the elections in 1997, affecting 211 municipalities—a fourth of the country. In that year, the FARC threatened elections in one third of all municipalities, and in 30 people could not vote. In 2000, there were 114 homicides and 133 kidnappings in 157 municipalities (FSD 2007). In 2003, 50 candidates were unable to contest the elections: 32 candidates were killed, while 17 were kidnapped and 6 survived attacks.[14] In 2007, 29 candidates were assassinated and in 2011 the number increased to 41. In addition, 88 candidates were threatened, 23 survived attacks and 8 were kidnapped.[15]

Several authors have investigated the links between war and politics in Colombia (e.g. Acemoglu et. al 2009; Lopez 2011; Chavez and Robinson 2011; Romero 2003; Peñate 1999; Eaton 2006). This literature has provided very detailed accounts of the ways in which armed groups relied on coercion and alliances to infiltrate elections, local governments, and even the national congress. However, to our knowledge none of the existing studies have

[14] Clarin Newspaper http://old.clarin.com/diario/2003/10/26/i-02102.htm

[15] http://www.abc.es/20111031/internacional/abcp-candidatos-asesinados-elecciones-locales-20111031.html

explored the effects of this intervention on local governments.

4.3 The quality of candidates

In Colombia several agencies have information on the illegal conduct and sanctions of elected officials and candidates. The Procuraduría Nacional de la Nación (PGN) is in charge of investigating administrative abuses by state employees, including the police and military. Some of these sanctions can be under criminal jurisdiction so there are referred to the Fiscalia General de la Nacion, the national prosecution agency in the country. The police, the recently shut down intelligence agency DAS, the Fiscalia, and the judiciary system have information on different kinds of offences. Prior to every election, the National Electoral Council (NEC) receives information from different agencies and decides—through sentences by its judges—which registered candidates are not allowed to run for office and should therefore be removed from the ballot. Since 2009, it is illegal to run for office for those who have been sentenced for affecting the assets of the state; belonging, supporting or funding illegal armed organizations; committing crimes against humanity; or drug-trafficking in Colombia or abroad. Candidate registrations can only be revoked when there is full proof that they meet the criteria established by the law.

Before this new law, few candidate registrations were revoked. In the local elections of 2007, for example, only 269 candidates were not allowed to run for office. In the regional and local elections of 2011, on the contrary, the CNE removed from the ballot a total of 821 candidates. Of these, 73% involved candidates for local councils, 18% for local administrative juntas, 6% for mayors, and 3% for Department Assemblies (the legislative bodies in each of the 32 departments). We focus on elections for local councils, which are crucial for the quality of local governments. Local councils promulgate local laws, approve local policies, and oversee the local administration, including approving contracts made by the mayor. Table 1 presents the number of banned candidates disaggregated by party and department (we only included the parties and departments with the highest number of candidates).

Reasons for revoking the registration of these candidates include: having previous disciplinary or criminal sanctions, having signed contracts with the state in unlawful ways, sanctions due to fiscal irresponsibility, impeachments, or having been prevented from exercising a profession (like attorney). The list of candidates whose inscription has been

revoked we used in the analysis is of public record. Although we do not have data on the kind of offenses yet, data on previous years suggests that these are often serious: in 2007 79% were criminal offenses, 8% were related to disciplinary issues, and 13% to fiscal ones.

5 Econometric Evidence

5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the econometric analysis. The dependent variable is the number of candidates who were banned by the CNE to run for office due to past offenses. We have two measures: one that includes only candidates running for municipal councils, and one that also includes candidates running for mayor. The data come from the resolutions made by CNE judges. In 348 municipalities—about a third of the country—at least one candidate was removed from the ballot. Of those municipalities, 70% have only one candidate banned, 20% have two, and the remaining 10% have between 4 and 7.

The main explanatory variable is the rate per 1000 of political homicides from 1988 to 2001 as registered by the National Police. The data include homicides of politicians, candidates, ex-politicians and local leaders (e.g., community organizers). During this period, a total of 2,281 politicians were killed. In half of all municipalities at least one politician was killed; in 20%, two were killed; and in the remaining 30% between 3 and 58 candidates were assassinated. In one municipality—Medellín—120 candidates were killed.

Our third source of information tries to measure the possible determinants of corruption. There is a vast literature on the causes of corruption, mostly at the national level. We focus on variables that can vary sub-nationally and therefore help explain variation across municipalities. We identify five potential factors that can lead to corruption: (i) inequality (Gray and Kaufmann 1998; Tanzi 1998; Husted ; 1999; Swamy et al. 1999); poverty (Treisman (2000; Paldam 2001, 2002); state intervention in the market, especially via subsidies (La Porta et al. 1999); weak social capital—the lack of trusting and engaged civic communities (Bjornskov, 2004; La Porta et al., 1997; Uslaner, 2001; 2004; Zak and Knack, 2001); formal enforcing institutions, especially judges and the police (Leys 1970; World Development Report 1997); and political competition (Rose-Ackerman 1978).

To control for these potential determinants of corruption, we include the natural loga-

rithm of population in 2010, distance to the capital city of the respective department, and distance to county's capital (Bogota D.C.). We include a measure of how urban or rural the municipality is, calculated as the proportion of the total population living in the county head and two measures of transfers from the central government to municipal governments (in nominal Colombian pesos of 2010). The first transfer is a royalty proportional to the mineral production of the municipality and the second one is an automatic transfer based on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Although the reported rents associated with mining is potentially endogenous to the overall level of corruption, the main source of variation in royalties received is driven by the international price of the main commodities exported (i.e., gold, oil and coal). We use average transfers from 2008 to 2010. Both variables come from the National Planning Department (DNP).

To control for potential determinants of corruption in 1988, we use land GINI coefficient from 1988 and 2010 as a proxy of inequality, from the Center of Economic Development (CEDE) at los Andes University; the percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs (NBI) in 1988 as a proxy of poverty, coming also from CEDE; and the number of civic organizations in 1996, provided by The Social Foundation. Finally, we include a dummy that measures whether the FARC were present in 1987-1989 in the municipality; the source is Colombia's military intelligence.

Lastly, to engage with the recent literature on the determinants of criminality among Indian representatives we include a variable capturing the level of (local) political competition in the locality. In the Colombian case, however, this variable is highly endogenous to the armed conflict since we know that town controlled by paramilitaries tend to exhibit lower levels of political competition (see Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos 2012; Gallego 2011). We proxy competition by the highest share of seats won by a party in the 2007 council election. These data come from Colombia's National Civil Registry (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil).

5.2 The Correlates of Corruption

We start by investigating the association between candidates accused and sectioned for corruption in 2011 and all the political violence during the late 1980s and 1990s. We

approximate this relation through the following linear equation

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta v_i + \mathbf{X}_i' \gamma + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where y_i is the number of corrupt politicians banned in municipality i, v_i is our measure of political violence during the post-1988 period which is the main independent variable throughout the analysis.[16] Thus, the coefficient of interest is β. The vector $\mathbf{X}_i$ contains a full set of covariates and ε_i captures all other unobserved factors influencing the quality of candidates in municipality i.

Table 2 presents a preliminary estimation of (1) by OLS. All standard errors reported are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. In columns 1-4 we restrict the estimation to candidates for municipal councils and in columns 5-6 we include candidates in both councils and mayoral elections. Column 1 shows a simple bivariate model where we only include our measure of political violence. In this simple model the political violence of the 1990s has a positive and significant effect on the number of corrupt candidates in the 2011 election. If we were to interpret this effect as a causal one, a one-standard deviation increase in violence would imply an increase of almost 8 percentage points ($5.68 \times 0.013 \approx 7.7\%$) in the number of corrupt candidates backed by parties. Since the mean value of corrupt candidates in the sample is 0.42 this effect is substantial (it would imply a difference of more than 18 points between municipalities with relatively high and with average levels of violence).

In columns (2)-(5) we explore the robustness of this result by including some potential exogenous controls influencing the market for corruption. In column (2) we include (log) population, distance to the capital of the respective department and distance to the nation capital. Population has an almost mechanical effect on the number of banned candidates since the size of the municipal council is a function of population.[17] Hence is possible to have higher numbers of bad candidates in bigger municipalities simply because there are more candidates in these places. In fact, as the model shows population has a highly significant positive effect. Municipalities closer to the department capital and to Bogota could have better bureaucracies and institutions for historical reasons and these may still influence

[16] Although our dependent variable is a count event we use a liner specification to simplify the analysis and facilitate the inclusion of a wide set of control and the implementation of an IV model. All results in this section are robust to a non-linear specification estimated via Maximum Likelihood (e.g., negative binomial model).

[17] Councils increase in a non-linear fashion in terms of total population. Big cities have a maximum size of 41 council members.

the quality of candidates today. However, the former is not statistically significant and the latter has a negative effect. This indicates that municipalities closer to the nation capital have on average *more* corrupt candidates. More importantly, the size and significance of our measure of historical political violence remains robust to the inclusion of these controls.

In column (3) we include a set of variables capturing the economic incentives that may influence the supply of bad and good candidates, namely royalties and transfers–the two types of fiscal transfers received by each locality mentioned in the previous section. We use average transfers from 2008 to 2010 for both variables. Surprisingly, these economic variables have a very small nonsignificant effect on the number of bad candidates. In column (4) we include a variable measuring the level of political competition in the municipality based on the highest number of seats won by any given party in the 2007 council election. As seen, this measure of competition is highly significant and positive. This supports our claim that parties have incentives to endorse bad candidates in highly competitive environments.[18] Lastly, columns (5)-(6) include the candidates for mayoral races in the dependent variable so we model the determinants of all candidates running for local positions.[19] The effect of violence is positive and consistent with the previous models for council candidates.

Overall, the results of Table 1 suggest a positive, significant, and substantial correlation between the political violence of the 1980s and 1990s and the number of bad candidates in 2011. Although this correlation is robust there are many reasons why this relationship might not be causal. For instance, armed groups may have chosen to be more violent in towns that were already more corrupt and hence had already a higher number of corrupt politicians. In other words, there could be a reversed causation process between political violence and corruption. Perhaps even more problematic is the possibility that the same factors shaping the demand and supply for bad candidates could also influence the incentives to exercise violence against a specific political group. These problems can be solved by an instrument for the political violence -which was mostly targeted to left-wing parties created in the late 1980s. In the next section we use precisely the seat share won by these parties in the 1988 council election, year in which local elections for mayor were introduced for the first time, as an instrument for the post-1988 violence. If this variable has no direct effect

[18] This positive effect of competition is also consistent with existing research on the permissiveness of corruption in the India's lower house of representatives (see e.g., Aidt, Golden and Tiwari 2011)

[19] We excluded candidates running for the *Juntas Administradoras Locales* (JAL's) of each municipality for data availability issues.

on the quality of the candidates in the 2011 election (other than its effect on the post-1988 violence) it can be excluded from (1) and the effect of violence identified. We now explain why this exclusion restriction is plausible.

5.3 The Instrument: Strength of Third Parties in the 1988 Election

The Patriotic Union party (UP) was formed in 1984 by the FARC and the Communist Party as a product of peace talks between the government and the FARC. It attracted FARC supporters as well as left-wing militants, union members, and teachers who were not members or supporters of the FARC. It quickly became the third political force in the country: in the presidential elections of 1986, the UP candidate got almost half million votes, an unprecedented success for non-traditional parties. In the regional and parliamentary elections, it had again an unexpected victory with over 20 departmental representatives and 7 congressmen. In the local elections of 1988,16 UP mayors and 256 council members were elected.

After the peace talks with the government failed, the military and political establishment soon stigmatized the UP as the political branch of the FARC. Political decentralization threatened local elites who suddenly realized they could lose their power at the polls. In addition, economic decentralization—which entailed transfers from the central government to municipal governments—made local politics even more important, as whoever controlled the local government had access to unprecedented amounts of public resources. The reaction was immediate: paramilitary and state forces initiated a campaign to eliminate the UP and its base. By the end of the 1990s, around 3,000 UP militants have been killed including two presidential candidates and 13 members of parliament. The party was wiped out.

These assassinations of UP militants are strongly correlated with the overall number of political killings in the 1990s. Most were perpetrated by paramilitaries in areas of high guerrilla influence where UP support was strong. This violence could be explained by two facts: first, the paramilitaries wanted to physically eliminate the UP and killing its leaders was a key strategy. And second, as Steele (2010) argues, paramilitaries used violence to trigger the displacement of loyal supporters of the guerrillas in an effort to consolidate its power. Steele shows both with cross-municipal and sub-municipal data that violence was

particularly high in municipalities, and in neighborhoods within municipalities, where the UP had broad support. The total vote share of the left in 1988 is thus strongly correlated with political killings in the next decade—and therefore a relevant instrument.

Turning to the exclusion restriction, there are two potential problems to consider. First, reversed causality: could UP support in 1988 be higher in corrupt municipalities? While plausible, this is unlikely. UP support was high in areas that have had guerrilla presence. Economic decentralization did not happen until the 1990s and the power and resources of local governments was therefore very limited. It is unlikely that the FARC tried to expand to corrupt municipalities in particular. In fact, according to different studies FARC's expansion in that early period was mostly explained by poverty and inequality (Vélez 1999; Echandía 1999). In addition, studies of the history of the UP show that mobilization was high not only in rural, peripheral areas but also in places with large companies and strong unions (Dudley 2004). To test the robustness of the instrument, we control for the determinants of corruption and FARC expansion in 1988.

The second potential problem is that of omitted variables: is there a factor that explains guerrilla expansion in the 1980s and also corruption in 2011? Colombia has experienced many important changes between 1988 and 2011 in terms of demographics, state presence, policies affecting local governments, and even the geography of conflict. It is unlikely that the FARC were attracted then by the same features that explain corruption now beyond the structural factors that the literature has associated with corruption such as poverty and inequality. While we cannot be certain that there are no other omitted variables, we control for the determinants of corruption in 1988 following the literature discussed in the previous section.

5.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation

In all models we use the seat share won by all the third parties in the 1988 council election as an instrument of political violence during the 1988-1999 period.[20] As mentioned, these parties were mainly left-wing movements created shortly after the peace process of 1984 and the first wave of decentralizing reforms which culminated in a new constitution

[20] These are simply all parties other than the Conservative party and Liberal party. Since in this election a faction of traditionally Liberals run for the "New Liberalism" party, we treat Liberal and New Liberals as the same party. The main third parties were the UP (*Union Patriotica*) and the Communist Party of Colombia (*Partido Comunista Colombiano*).

in 1991. Among these parties, the UP was the most successful winning 253 seats across all municipalities. Although we cannot quantify with our data the exact number of UP members and militants killed during the entire post-1988 period, it is clear that the political violence during this period corresponds mainly to the systematic extermination of this party.[21] Hence, at first hand the relevance of the instrument is strong (the evidence discussed below indicates that the seat share of left-wing parties is in fact a very robust predictor of post-1988 political assassinations).

The first stage relationship between violence and the electoral support for non-traditional parties is given by

$$v_i = \alpha^F + \phi z_i + \mathbf{X}_i' \gamma^F + \varepsilon_i^F, \tag{2}$$

where z_i is the excluded instrument and all other variables are as defined before. The identifying moment in this framework is that $cov(z_i, \varepsilon_i | \mathbf{X}_i) = 0$, where ε_i is the original error term in the second stage regression (1). This means that conditional on some observables, our seat share measure has no direct effect on y other than by its influence over v_i.

Table 3 reports the estimation of (1) and (2) via two-stage least squares (2SLS). The first panel in the table reports the estimates of the instrumented regression and panel B reports the corresponding first stage for each model. In column (1) we have the simple bivariate regression estimated in column (1), table 2, between corrupt candidates and violence. The effect of political violence is now much bigger, the point estimate increases to 50.6 which represents almost a substantial increase over the OLS estimate. This indicates that the OLS estimate is severely biased downwards which suggests that classical measurement error is more likely to be the source of bias than a typical omitted variable problem (e.g., reversed causation between y and v).[22] Even though the jump from the OLS to the 2SLS is substantial, the effect is not out of sample. Specifically, the point estimate of 50.6 implies a causal effect of 68 percentage points (i.e., an increase of almost 0.7 corrupt candidates).

[21] For example according to some sources, in 1988 more than 260 members of the UP were killed (El Saldo Rojo de la UP, Verdad Abierta). In our data, the total number of political assassinations in 1988 is 304. Case study and recent quantitative studies suggest that these killings were mainly in municipalities were the UP had a strong electoral following.

[22] The jump in the effect of violence is so high that it could be explained by the presence of a weak instrument (Hanh and Housman 2003). To address this concern we calculated the critical F of Stock and Yogo's (2005) characterization test of weak instruments. In this test the null hypothesis is that the set of instruments is weak. Setting the 5% as the maximum bias we are willing to tolerate in a nominal Wald test the critical test statistic is 16.38. As reported in table 3, the F statistic of our instrument is 17.9 so we reject the null of having a weak instrument.

Similarly, a two-standard deviation increase in homicides will increase the number of corrupt candidates by 1.4. This effect is very plausible, in fact we have 286 municipalities with two or more corrupt candidates. Hence, although the causal effect seems to be very important is not the only source of variation in the participation of corrupt candidates.

The rest of table 3 tests the robustness of the result. Column (2) shows very similar results to those obtained in Table 2: population has a positive and significant effect on the number of bad politicians, while the distance from Bogota has a negative, significant effect. In column (3) the proxies of economic incentives for bad candidates–transfers from the central government to the municipality–remain insignificant, as in Table 2.

In columns (4) to (7) we control for factors that could explain UP vote share and also corruption. In all cases, except one, the political violence estimates change little with the addition of controls. Interestingly, columns (4) and (5) indicate that poverty in 1988 has a negative and significant effect on the quality of candidates in 2011. This result is consistent with the idea that corruption is more likely when resources are available; at the same time, the first stage regression shows that the FARC did not expand to particularly corrupt places, as poverty is positively and significantly correlated with the vote share of the left in 1988. Income inequality in 1988 has no significant effect on the quality of candidates in 2011, although it does negatively correlate with the vote share of the UP. These results suggest that the vote share for the left in 1988 tended to be high in poor but not particularly unequal municipalities, while corruption in 2011 tends to happen in richer localities, regardless the level of inequality.

In column (6) we control for guerrilla presence in 1987 to 1989. The first stage regression shows that, indeed, guerrilla presence has a highly significant positive effect on the vote share of the left. The effect of political violence loses significance, most likely because it is strongly correlated with our instrument. In column (7) we control for social capital as proxied by the number of civic organizations in 1996; contrary to the hypothesis that social capital helps to prevent public corruption, we find that it has a positive and significant effect on the number of bad candidates in the ballot.

5.5 Placebo Test, Other Forms of Violence

Lastly, as a "placebo" test we analyze the impact of other forms of violence during the same period on the same model of banned candidates in 2011. Specifically, we use two

different types of homicides: massacres against civilians and total killings of members of the armed forces (i.e., National Army and the National Police). We complement these two measures with a count variable indicating the total number of "terrorist attacks" in the municipality. These include attacks against the infrastructure (e.g., power towers), small explosive devises, and "incendiary" attacks. All these measures are from the human rights observatory of the Vice-presidential Office (OHH).

Table 5 presents the results using the same OLS specification as before including the same set of covariates. As seen, from the three new measures only the number of massacres has a positive, statistically significant effect, even though this effect is marginally significant and not robust in the council candidates model. The effect of members of the armed forces killed and the number of attacks is very close to zero and highly insignificant. Overall, these results confirm the specific permanent effect of selective political murder during war on the quality of democratic candidates in areas under contest.

Overall, the results indicate that political homicides during war have a long lasting effect on the quality of politicians.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we explore the impact of violence against local politicians on the quality of representation in contexts where civil war and democracy coexist. We argue that armed groups have incentives to interfere in local elections in order to enhance their territorial control as well as the benefits they derive from it. They rely on three strategies: using violence against politicians who are not amenable to the groups' interests; influencing voting behavior; and engaging in fraud to alter the results of elections.

We identify several mechanisms by which these strategies decrease participation in politics among skillful candidates who are not allied with the armed actors. As these individuals are more likely to be killed, displaced or expelled from the political system, finding them on the ballot will become harder. Over time, this self-selection mechanism can shape the political landscape even after armed groups have left the area or the war has ended. On one hand, there will simply be very few skillful individuals doing politics when the war ends. On the other hand, the status associated with being a politician is likely to be reduced during the war as the community learned about the profiles of those in politics. In such a

context, skillful and honest individuals will be less likely to embark in a political career.

We test an observable implication of this theory by evaluating the effect of violence against politicians on the quality of representation in a sample of Colombian municipalities. We find that violence against local authorities during the late 1980s and mid-1990s is associated with higher rates of criminal candidates in 2011. The effect is substantial and robust to a number of controls and model specifications.

To address the potential endogeneity between corruption, criminality and past violence, we exploit differences in the support for third-parties in 1988 as an instrument for initial levels of violence. Our instrumental variables estimates confirm a large positive effect of war violence in the 1980s and 1990s on the quality of political candidates in 2011.

Using a placebo test, we also show that other war dynamics fail to have a similar effect on the quality of local candidates. Past massacres, military casualties, and terrorist acts all fail to be associated with current levels of electoral corruption. These results suggest that it is not the armed conflict in general but rather the attacks against politicians that affect the quality of representation.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it shows a specific mechanism by which civil war affects democracy both in the short and long run, namely the quality of representation. And second, it shows that disaggregating civil war is essential to advance our understanding of its effects. Future work could explore evidence of the specific mechanisms by which political violence shapes the supply and demand of good candidates, namely displacement, politicians abandoning their careers, and the incentives for parties to endorse bad candidates. In addition, it is worth exploring the effect of political homicides on other proxies of the quality of government such as the return of spending on education and health. Our results also call for more research on the institutional and political consequences of civil war, especially at the sub-national level.

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Figure 1-Homicidies of Local Authorities, 1988-2006



Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Policía Nacional de Colombia

Table 1-Banned Candidates for Local Councils, 2011 Election

Party/Department	Antioquia	Boyaca	Cundi-marca	Santander	Tolima	Valle	Cesar	Total Partido
Partido Cambio Radical	16	13	23	11	16	11	3	162
Movimiento de Inclusion y Oportunidades (MIO)	15	2	13	4	5	4	14	114
Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (U)	8	24	0	9	3	9	1	57
Mov. Alianza Social Independiente (AS)	3	1	1	3	6	3	1	32
Partido Liberal Colombiano	4	7	4	1	2	1	4	34
Partido Conservador	1	2	3	0	1	4	0	12
Total Department	62	55	56	35	37	42	30	559

Source: Comisión Nacional Electoral (CNE), Colombia.

Table 2-Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Revoked council candidacies 2011	0.42	0.83	0	7	1220
Revoked mayor candidacies 2011	0.03	0.03	0	2	1124
Political homicides rate 1988-2001	0.6	1.3	0	20.4	1117
Population 2010	40,561	249,892	284	7,363,782	1122
Distance to depart. capital	120	97	0	600	1062
Distance to Bogota	5.3	5.9	.002	46.9	1062
Urban rate	43%	24%	1.7%	99%	1122
Average royalties 2008-2010	1,649	6,765	0	67,614	1098
Average transfers 2008-2010	13,714	75,589	1,173	2,123,474	1098
Competition 2007	59%	13%	0%	100%	1091
GINI 1988	0.698	0.104	0.214	0.936	1062
UBN 1988	59	17	11	100	1083
Guerrilla presence 1987-1989	0.11	0.31	0	1	1052
Number of civil organizations 1993	141	341	0	8,269	1055

Table 3-Covariates of Revoked Candidates, OLS

Dependent variable:	Council candidates revoked				Council and mayoral candidates revoked	
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Political homicides 1988-2001	5.685**	5.928**	5.774**	5.580**	5.619**	5.581**
	(2.430)	(2.800)	(2.773)	(2.742)	(2.457)	(2.767)
Log population 2010		0.245***	0.224***	0.187***		0.197***
		(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.062)		(0.063)
Log distance to depart. capital		-0.018	-0.011	-0.01		-0.021
		(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)		(0.033)
Distance to Bogota		-0.024***	-0.029***	-0.030***		-0.030***
		(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)
Urban rate			0.18	0.113		0.129
			(0.122)	(0.124)		(0.129)
Log (real) royalties 2008-2010			0.009	0.006		0.008
			(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Log (real) transfers 2008-2010			0.015	0.036		0.021
			(0.097)	(0.097)		(0.097)
Competition 2010				0.719***		0.754***
				(0.187)		(0.19)
Constant	0.430***	-1.696***	-1.735***	-1.956***	0.462***	-1.872***
	(0.029)	(0.364)	(0.462)	(0.463)	(0.029)	(0.468)
Observations	1117	1061	1044	1040	1117	1040
R-squared	0.008	0.123	0.126	0.136	0.007	0.138

Table 4-IV 2SLS Regressions

Dependent variable:	Council candidates revoked						
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Panel A. 2SLS Regression						
Political homicides 1988-2001	50.632**	28.16*	28.619*	34.638**	31.447*	30.25	30.501**
	(19.85)	(16.49)	(9.153)	(17.00)	(17.500)	(19.1)	(16.691)
Log population 2010		0.259***	0.279***	0.225***	0.237***	0.2367***	0.218***
		(0.028)	(0.817)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Log distance to depart. Capital		-0.053	-0.064		-0.036	-0.54	-0.051
		(0.037)	(0.040)		(0.038)	(0.005)	(0.039)
Distance to Bogota		-0.029***	-0.028***		-0.022**	-0.029***	-0.028***
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Urban rate			0.025		-0.002		
			(0.169)		(0.237)		
Log (real) royalties 2008-2010			0.005				
			(0.010)				
Log (real) transfers 2008-2010			-0.037				
			(0.093)				
GINI 1988				0.078	0.011		
				(0.334)	(0.342)		
UBN 1988				-0.009***	-0.004		
				(0.002)	(0.003)		
Guerrilla presence 1987-1989						-0.086	
						(0.174)	
Number civil organizations 1993							0.000***
							(0.0001)
	Panel B. First Stage for Political Homicides 1988-2001						
Third party vote share 1988	0.010***	0.103***	0.011***	0.010***	0.009***	0.009***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log population 2010		0.000	-0.002***	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000	0.000
		(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Log distance to depart. Capital		0.001***	0.001***		0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Distance to Bogota		0.000	-0.000		-0.000**	0.000**	0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urban rate			0.006***		0.009***		
			(0.002)		(0.002)		
Log (real) royalties 2008-2010			0.000				
			(0.000)				
Log (real) transfers 2008-2010			0.002**				
			(0.001)				
GINI 1988				-0.008**	-0.009**		
				(0.004)	(0.003)		
UBN 1988				0.000***	0.000***		
				(0.000)	(0.000)		
Guerrilla presence 1987-1989						0.007***	
						(0.001)	
Number civil organizations 1993							0.000
							(0.000)
Observations	1009	997	995	997	997	996	996
R-squared	0.017	0.035	0.052	0.038	0.054	0.066	0.036
F (instrument)	17.94	18.20	22	18.43	16.89	14.26	18.91

Table 5-Other Forms of Violence 1988-1999

OLS regressions						
Dependent variable:	Council candidates revoked			Council and mayoral candidates revoked		
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Massacre rate 1988-1999	0.024 (0.019)			0.025* (0.015)		
Military casualty rate 1988-1999		0.004 (0.019)			-0.003 (0.021)	
Terrorist attack rate 1988-1999			-0.003 (0.006)			-0.005 (0.006)
Observations	1009	995	997	997	997	996
R-squared	0.017	0.052	0.054	0.035	0.038	0.066
F (instrument)	17.94	22	16.89		18.43	14.26